

18 the non-proliferation agreement, the anti-ballistic missile movements, the sale of arms, etc.

Now, following up Senator Carlson's question, I refer to your statement in which you referred to a proper balance of policy having two parts: one, a firm front with respect to the Soviets in any matter affecting our interest and security and, two, a flexibility or, I believe you described it, as an open door to the initiatives which they might make or responses to our initiatives which they were willing to take.

Now, to measure this proper balance of firm policy against the developments in the anti-ballistic missile field, I would welcome your further elucidation of views, accepting your statement just made that you think it is wise for the United States to undertake to achieve an agreement, and you have some hope of completing such an agreement.

Mr. Kennan. It is my impression that this is a matter which is now under discussion or that we intend to have it under discussion at an early date.

Senator Gore. Yes.

I concur in your view in that respect. I was only laying a predicate with respect to the time element.

The United States is advised, as I understand it, that the Soviet Union is proceeding to deploy an ABM system in and around Moscow, whatever those terms mean with respect to distance, and in perhaps 26 other areas.

b. Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense

We have been aware for many years that the Soviets have been working on an anti-ballistic missile defense system, just as we have been. After a series of abortive starts, it now appears that the Soviets are deploying such a system (using the "GALOSH" missile, publicly displayed in 1964) around Moscow. They are also deploying another type of defensive system elsewhere in the Soviet Union, but the weight of the evidence at this time suggests that this system is not intended primarily for anti-ballistic missile defense. However, knowing what we do about past Soviet predilections for defense systems a/, we must, for the time being, plan our forces on the assumption that they will have deployed some sort of an ABM system around their major cities by the early 1970s. Whether made up of GALOSH only, or a combination of GALOSH and other types of missiles, a full scale deployment would cost the Soviet Union at least \$20 to \$25 billion.

2. The Red Chinese Nuclear Threat

There has been no basic change in our estimates of the Red Chinese nuclear threat. Their firing of a nuclear armed missile over a distance of a few hundred miles last October falls within the limits of that estimate. They will require many more tests before they achieve a truly operational capability with a medium or intermediate range missile, and this will take time.

With regard to an ICBM, we believe that the Red Chinese nuclear weapons and ballistic missile development programs are being pursued with high priority. On the basis of recent evidence, it appears possible that they may conduct either a space or a long-range ballistic missile launching before the end of 1967. However, it appears unlikely that the Chinese could deploy a significant number of operational ICBMs before the mid-1970s, or that those ICBMs would have great reliability, speed of response, or substantial protection against attack.

The Soviets for more than a decade have spent substantially more on air defense against strategic bombers than has the U.S. But if our Strategic Air Command is correct in its judgment that a very high proportion of the U.S. incoming bombers could penetrate the Soviet defenses and reach their targets, and I have no reason to dispute it, then we must conclude that the bulk of these Soviet expenditures has been wasted.